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PREFACE: 
Goals of the WASH Guidance Document
The primary goal of this document is to provide necessary information on the importance, nature and 
application of the theory of social norms to sanitation specialists. In order to promote positive social 
change with regard to many harmful collective patterns of behavior related to sanitation, understanding 
the theory of social norms is crucial. 
Penn SONG has worked with UNICEF and partner organizations on sanitation and other collective pat-
terns of behavior for many years. These partnerships have produced direct training to sanitation and 
other specialists on the theory of social norms, as well as a joint Penn/UNICEF Coursera on social norms 
and social change. Those interested in further knowledge of the nature of social norms and social change 
are strongly encouraged to seek out the available Coursera training modules. In addition, Cristina Bicchieri 
– founder of the theory of social norms and Director of Penn SONG – has transformed previous work, 
notably The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms (2006), into a book dedicat-
ed to the application of the theory of social norms to real world problems with Oxford University Press: 
Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms (2016). Practitioners eager for fur-
ther knowledge are strongly encouraged to seek out these source materials.
This document aims to distill the insights from these joint collaborations into one place to aid WASH 
specialists aiming to bring about positive social change with regard to harmful collective patterns of 
behavior related to sanitation.
This document is not meant as a replacement to the Handbook on Community-Led Total Sanitation or 
Facilitating “Hands-On” Training Workshops for Community-Led Total Sanitation: A Trainer’s Training Guide 
or any other relevant sanitation document. Rather, this document aims to complement the literature in 
sanitation by blending aspects of the social norm approach to social change with existing best practices 
and standards, wherever possible. 
Why would the theory of social norms help complement existing best practices in WASH? We need to be 
able to explain and predict behavior. For example, we need to explain why people defecate in the open, 
and we need to be able to predict the conditions under which they would use latrines. In order to explain 
and predict behavior, the theory of social norms says that we must understand reasons for action. The 
theory presupposes that people do what they do because of their reasons for action; therefore, in order 
to explain and predict behavior, we must identify those reasons. Further, we must be able to differentiate 
behaviors, especially collective patterns of behavior. This is to say, not all collective patterns of behavior 
are due to the same reasons. Moreover, a single type of collective behavior – say, latrine maintenance – 
may be due to one kind of reason in one setting but to another kind of reason in a different setting. In 
order to understand the reasons that motivate collective behaviors, we must be guided by a specific 
model of behavior. Finally, we must be able to measure the behavior and the reasons for action. In order 
to explain and predict behavior, a model must have measurable components. The theory of social norms 
provides a specific model of behavior that has measurable components allowing us to identify reasons for 
action and to differentiate collective patterns of behavior. Identifying these reasons and diagnosing the 
collective pattern of behavior in a reliably measurable way is a key to successful interventions. 
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This is not to say that the social norms approach is a panacea that will solve all remaining difficulties 
in promoting positive social change with respect to sanitation-related behaviors. Social change is often 
difficult to achieve, and there are often a variety of factors that contribute to existing harmful practices – 
technological, legal, political, economic, and so on. The theory of social norms, though, can serve as an 
additional tool to bring about social change – in particular, by understanding what motivates people to en-
gage in certain collective patterns of behavior, by providing new tools of measurement and diagnosis that 
reveal the drivers of behavior, and by synthesizing insights concerning how to bring about social change 
once one has reliably diagnosed and measured the drivers of behavior.
One aspect of sanitation that the theory of social norms brings out clearly is that communities are often 
facing a collective action problem whenever they move from open defecation to latrine use. 
Collective action is often associated with a social dilemma: i.e., a situation in which what is in the best 
interest of each individual makes everyone worse off. For example, it can be in the “best interest” of each 
individual to defecate in the open – they do not have to spend money on building or maintaining latrines. 
But if every individual thinks that way and acts on it, then the community suffers a negative public health 
impact. Since sanitation requires the cooperation of all in a community in order to reap public benefits, 
social norms can become a powerful mechanism for solving the social dilemma that is embedded in 
collective action. 
The theory of social norms helps explain the nature of sanitation-related collective 
action problems, identify the drivers of behavior, and give guidance to promoting 
sanitation and health in communities.
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3SECTION 1: 
The Basic Concepts of the Theory of Social Norms
The theory of social norms starts with asking the basic question: Why do people do what they do? We 
can make the question more focused by asking about specific behaviors: Why do people engage in 
open defecation? Why do people not wash their hands? We can make the question more focused still 
by asking about the specific behaviors of specific people: Why do these people in this area engage in 
open defecation?
The people who are engaged in the harmful collective pattern of behavior and those who work to 
change or eliminate the behavior will each have ideas about why, for example, people are engaging in 
open defecation. But it is imperative that we reliably know why people are openly defecating, and it 
is insufficient to rely upon intuition or educated guesses. Misdiagnosis or misidentification of what is 
causing the behavior could lead to failed interventions, which unnecessarily prolong the negative public 
health impacts of the harmful behavior and end up costing additional time and money. 
The basic concepts of the theory of social norms provide the groundwork for a theory of social behavior 
and social change. By using relatively simple, well-grounded, and, importantly, measureable concepts, 
the theory of social norms allows us to identify the causes and drivers of behavior (Bicchieri 2006, 2016). 
These are the relevant concepts:
4Independent and Interdependent Behaviors
4Factual Beliefs and Personal Normative Beliefs
4Empirical Expectations and Normative Expectations
4Conditional and Unconditional Preferences
4Reference Networks
With these concepts, we can both measure and diagnose different collective patterns of behavior by 
referencing their characteristic motivational profile. There are four types of collective patterns of behavior:
4Custom
4Moral Norm
4Descriptive Norm
4Social Norm
Each type of collective pattern of behavior has a different type of reason for action. Two are especially 
salient for work on sanitation: customs and social norms. As we will see, many harmful collective 
patterns of behavior related to sanitation – such as open defecation – are customs; that is, many people 
engage in open defecation because they believe that it meets their needs and that open defecation is 
not that harmful to themselves and relevant others. They almost never defecate in the open because 
they believe that it is the morally right thing to do or because they believe that relevant others think 
that they should defecate in that way. However, to eliminate open defecation in a particular group of 
people, we will often want to create a social norm promoting latrine usage and maintenance; that is, 
people will need to believe that relevant others think they should use and maintain latrines, and that 
belief will need to motivate people to engage in open defecation-free behaviors. 
4INTERDEPENDENT CHOICE 
one in which what I choose 
depends, in part, on what others choose.
This section explains and develops the basic concepts of the theory of social norms with specific reference 
to sanitation-related behaviors of interest.
For more in-depth explanations of the relevant theory and aspects of this section, please see the following:
4C. Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild, Oxford University Press 2016. Chapter 1.
4C. Bicchieri and R. Muldoon, “Social Norms.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011.
4C. Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms, 
     Cambridge University Press, 2006. Chapter 1.
1.1  Independent and Interdependent Behaviors
The first and most basic distinction in the theory of social norms is the distinction between independent 
and interdependent behaviors.
A behavior is independent just in case an individual behaves in a certain way regardless of whether others 
also behave in that way and whether others think that they should behave in a certain way. 
A behavior is interdependent just in case an individual behaves in a certain way because others also behave 
in that way or because others thinks that they should behave in a certain way or both. 
It can be difficult to reliably know whether a behavior is independent or interdependent merely by 
observing the behavior. A behavior that is independent in one context among one set of people may 
be interdependent in another context or among another set of people. Take the example of someone 
using a latrine. In an OD community, someone may behave that way – use a latrine – purely due to 
personal preference (an independent action). That exact same behavior in an ODF community may be 
due to fear of social sanctions, shaming or punishment (an interdependent action). In the first case, 
no one else’s behavior or expectations mattered. In the second, they motivated the behavior. Observation 
of behavior, per se, does not tell us whether the behavior is independent or interdependent. 
However, we know from many past experiences that open defecation – a harmful collective pattern of 
behavior – is often independent. Even though people may rightly believe that others in their community are 
practicing open defecation, that belief is not causing them to defecate in the open. Rather, they defecate in 
the open because they believe that this is a convenient way to meet their need of eliminating bodily waste. 
1.2  Factual Beliefs and Personal Normative Beliefs
The second basic distinction is between factual beliefs and personal normative beliefs.
Factual beliefs are beliefs about states of affairs or how the world is. One of the most relevant types of 
factual beliefs for our purposes are beliefs about cause and effect.
INDEPENDENT CHOICE 
 one in which what I choose 
does not depend on what others choose.
FACTUAL BELIEFS 
are beliefs about 
states of affairs 
or how the world is.
Here are some examples of factual beliefs relevant to sanitation:
4Children’s feces are safe.
4Most mothers do not wash their hands, and their children are     
     healthy.
4Open defecation is a fertilizer and not harmful.
4It is difficult to build a latrine in this terrain.
4Most schools cannot afford water and soap.
4No one will maintain the latrine.
Note that it is possible for factual beliefs to be wrong or false. The belief “Children’s feces are safe” is 
unfortunately common in many communities that practice open defecation, but it is false. The belief 
“Most mothers do not wash their hands, and their children are healthy” is a false causal belief. People 
who hold this belief think that there is no causal connection between handwashing and children’s health. 
This may, in some places, be a true but disappointing belief. 
Factual beliefs contribute and are causally related to people’s preferences. 
Personal normative beliefs are beliefs about what people should do. 
Personal normative beliefs can be about what I should do or what 
we should do or what other people should do or what everyone 
should do. Notice beliefs of this type all have a “should” element. 
Whenever there is a “should” element to a belief, then we are 
dealing with normativity. 
There are two types of personal normative beliefs: prudential and 
non-prudential. Prudential personal normative beliefs are beliefs about what people should do based on 
considerations of prudence or what is in their best interest. Non-prudential personal normative beliefs, 
by contrast, are beliefs about what people should do based on considerations over and above prudence. 
Exemplary cases on non-prudential personal normative beliefs are beliefs about what people should 
do based upon what morality or religion commands.
Here are some personal normative beliefs that may be relevant to sanitation:
4A real man should not use a latrine (non-prudential).
4A person should not put his feces on top of another person’s, especially of an opposite gender, as    
     mixing the feces would anger the gods (non-prudential).
4People should defecate far away from their homes to avoid the smell of feces (prudential).
4Human waste should be deposited in the fields as it fertilizes crops and makes the corn taste sweet    
     (prudential).
The first two are examples of non-prudential personal normative beliefs. The first belief is non-prudential 
because the explanation of the “should” references a “real man” – that is, to the “should” comes from 
existing ideas about masculinity and the behaviors expected of a “real man.” The second is more obviously 
non-prudential in that it references a religious belief. The next two examples are prudential – the “should” 
comes from how to action helps people get what they want: avoiding bad smells and producing good 
crops, respectively. 
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PERSONAL 
NORMATIVE  BELIEFS 
are beliefs about 
what people ought to do.
It is common in WASH programming to rely upon the idea 
of attitudes. Attitudes are evaluative dispositions toward 
some person, object, or behavior. As such, “attitude” is 
a broad category that includes likings and dislikings 
along with evaluations and personal normative beliefs. In 
this way, personal normative beliefs are a subset of the 
broader category of attitude. The theory of social norms 
uses the concept of personal normative belief rather than 
attitude because the concept attitude does not clearly 
distinguish prudential reasons from non-prudential reasons in the way that personal normative belief 
does. If someone believes that they should engage in some behavior because it is the morally right thing 
to do (non-prudential), that requires a very different intervention strategy than if someone believes they 
should engage in some behavior because it is convenient to them (prudential). Because of this difference 
in intervention strategy, we must make sure to use concepts that identify the causally-relevant factors 
that drive specific behaviors. Many of our “attitudes” or broadly evaluative beliefs are causally inert, 
and we must be able to distinguish the prudential from the 
non-prudential. Hence, the theory of social norms does not 
make use of the broader category of attitude.
Personal normative beliefs contribute to preferences and are 
causally relevant for them. While factual beliefs will always 
matter to all behaviors, personal normative beliefs will not. 
Personal normative beliefs will matter only when they are 
causing, at least in part, the behavior.
1.3  Empirical and Normative Expectations 
The third important distinction in the theory is the distinction between empirical expectations and 
normative expectations. The theory of social norms groups these two types of expectations under the 
umbrella concept of “social expectations,” for they are beliefs about other people. However, the distinction 
between empirical expectations and normative expectations is absolutely critical and a key aspect of the 
theory of social norms.
Empirical expectations are beliefs about what we expect others to do. 
Here are some examples of empirical expectations that may be relevant to sanitation:
4Everyone in my village practices open defecation.
4Most mothers and children do not wash their hands with soap and water 
    at critical times.
4People in the nearby village are building latrines.
Note that each of these empirical expectations are beliefs about what others 
do or are doing. But keep in mind that, as in the case with factual beliefs, empirical expectations can be 
false. For example, a person may believe that “most mothers and children do not wash their hands with 
soap and water at critical times,” but that belief could be mistaken. Empirical expectations are more 
likely to be true when the behavior is public and repeatable. 
PERSONAL 
NORMATIVE BELIEFS:
beliefs about what people should do
•  Narrower category
•  Simple to measure
•   Distinguishes between prudential and 
 non-prudential
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EMPIRICAL 
EXPECTATIONS: 
what we believe others do
ATTITUDES: evaluative dispositions 
toward some person, object or behavior
•  Broad category
•  Difficult to measure
•   Does not distinguish readily between prudential  
 and non-prudential personal normative beliefs
NORMATIVE 
EXPECTATIONS: 
what we believe others 
to think we should do
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Normative expectations are beliefs about what personal normative beliefs others have. Put another 
way, normative expectations are beliefs about what others think we should do.
Here are some examples of normative expectations that may be relevant to sanitation:
4Other people in the village think I should not defecate in the open.
4My friends think that people should defecate far away from their  
     homes in order to avoid the smell of feces.
4Men believe that women should not use the same latrines as the  
     men do.
Note that, like factual beliefs and empirical expectations, normative expectations are capable of being 
true or false. It is either true or false that other people in the village think I should not defecate in the 
open. Therefore, as in the case of factual beliefs and empirical expectations, normative expectations can 
be correct or incorrect. 
Normative expectations should not be confused with personal normative beliefs! Personal normative 
beliefs are personal beliefs about what people should do. Normative expectations are beliefs about 
other people’s personal beliefs about what people should do. A man may believe that it is perfectly 
acceptable for women to use the same latrines as men (personal normative belief), while also believing 
that all the other men think that women should not use the same latrines as men (normative expectation). 
1.4  Conditional Preferences and Unconditional Preferences 
The fourth basic distinction is the distinction between conditional preferences and unconditional 
preferences.
A preference is a disposition to act in a certain way in a certain situation. Importantly, preferences are 
intimately connected with choice. If I choose A over B – for whatever reason – then we say that I prefer 
A over B. For example, if I choose to defecate in the open rather than to use a latrine, then I prefer to 
defecate in the open rather than to use a latrine. Or say that I always wash my hands prior to handling 
food rather than simply handling the food without washing my hands; there, I prefer to wash hands 
prior to handling food rather than the alternative of not washing hands.
Importantly, preferences are not the same as likings. I may like B more than A, but if I always choose A 
over B, then I prefer A over B. For example, assume that there is an open defecation-free village. A person 
in that village may still like to defecate in the open (for example, defecating in the open would mean 
that they would not have to walk to a latrine or lose time in the field). However, because the person 
believes that the other villagers think they should use the latrine, the person uses the latrine instead. In 
this example, the person prefers to use the latrine but likes to defecate in the open. The liking does not 
translate into behavior though, for the person chooses to use the latrine. On the contrary, preferences are 
tightly connected to choice and behavior in a way that mere likings are not. This is a crucial point because 
we should not assume in programming or interventions that people like some behavior because they 
engage in it. Sometimes people like the behaviors they are engaged in, but at other times they do not. 
That said, people always prefer the behaviors that they engage in.
44
4
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Preferences can either be unconditional or conditional. Of course, in some sense, all of our beliefs are 
subject to some conditions. However, the theory of social norms divides preferences on the basis of 
whether they are conditional upon social expectations – empirical and normative.
A preference is socially unconditional just in case the person prefers to engage in the behavior regardless 
of whether others also engage in the behavior and whether others think that they should engage in 
the behavior. That is, when people have socially unconditional preferences, they prefer to engage in the 
behavior regardless of their empirical and normative expectations.
A preference is socially conditional when the person prefers to engage in the behavior because others 
are engaging in the behavior or because others think that they should engage in the behavior. That is, 
when people have socially conditional preferences, they prefer to engage in the behavior conditional 
upon empirical expectations, normative expectations, or both. From now on, when we say "conditional" 
or "unconditional" preference, we always mean "socially conditional" or "socially unconditional."
The distinction between unconditional preferences and conditional preferences mirrors the distinction 
between independent behaviors and interdependent behaviors. If I have an unconditional preference to 
engage in open defecation and if enough others have a similar preference, then open defecation in the 
village is an independent behavior. If I prefer to use a latrine because I believe that others think I should 
and if enough others have a similar preference, then latrine use in the village is an interdependent behavior. 
Importantly, if social expectations matter to behavior, then a change in social expectations should produce 
a change in behavior.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONDITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL PREFERENCES
PREFERENCE: A disposition to act in a certain way in a certain situation.
CONDITIONAL PREFERENCE: A preference is socially conditional when it depends on what I believe others do 
(empirical expectations) or what I believe others think I should do (normative expectations)
 UNCONDITIONAL PREFERENCE: A preference is socially unconditional when it does not matter what I believe 
others do (empirical expectations) or what I believe others think I should do (normative expectations) 
1.5  Reference Networks  
The fifth and final concept is that of a reference network.
If a person has a socially conditional preference to engage in some behavior, then their behavior depends, at 
least in part, on their empirical and/or normative expectations about other people. But which other people? 
The answer is that it varies for the type of behavior, situation and person considered. When you drive in New 
York, only the other drivers, pedestrians, cyclists, etc. that you may encounter matter to your choices. When 
you cook for your family, family members matter to your choice. Even if a Somali lives in London, it is well 
possible that, in matters of marriage, the people that matter to her are her extended family in Somalia. Only 
social expectations about certain relevant others will matter for the behavior – that is, cause the behavior.
A reference network is composed of those individuals whose behaviors and beliefs matter to my choice. 
When I am choosing whether to engage in some behavior, I refer to my social expectations of certain others.
The people who matter to one’s choice vary. In some cases, it may just be family members. In other cases, 
it could be a religious authority or co-workers or the entire village. 
9It is often the case in open defecation free communities that the reference network consists of the entire 
village. People will refer to their expectations about whether other community members are using latrines 
and whether other community members think that they should use latrines. 
THE REFERENCE NETWORK IS COMPOSED OF THE PEOPLE WHO MATTER TO ONE’S CHOICES. 
The behaviors and beliefs of people inside my reference network matter to me. 
The behaviors and beliefs of people outside my reference network matter very little or not at all.
1.6  Putting the Concepts to Work: Diagnosis  
With this stock of relatively simple, clear and measurable concepts, we can diagnose different collective 
patterns of behavior. 
The theory of social norms identifies four types of collective patterns of behavior:
4Custom
4Moral Norm
4Descriptive Norm
4Social Norm
Again, for many behaviors relevant to sanitation, the key types of collective patterns of behavior will be 
customs and social norms. 
An important thing to note is that “custom,” “moral norm,” “descriptive norm,” and “social norm” are 
being used in a technical sense. In what follows, there will be precise definitions of each of these terms. 
In social science and in programming, these terms are often used interchangeably. But, in the theory of 
social norms, these are all different types of behavior, with different characteristic motivational profiles, 
that require different intervention strategies. 
BEHAVIOR
 INDEPENDENT ACTION INTERDEPENDENT ACTION
because 
it's useful or 
meets a need
because you 
expect others 
to do it
because 
it's moral 
or right
because you expect 
others to do it and 
you think they expect 
you should too
CUSTOM MORAL 
RULE
DESCRIPTIVE 
NORM
SOCIAL
NORM
1.6.1  Customs 
A custom is a habitual pattern of behavior such that individuals prefer to conform to it because it meets 
their needs.
Customs are practices we engage in primarily because we think 
they will meet our needs or satisfy our desires. A practice is a 
custom, then, when we do it independently of our social 
expectations. That is, empirical and normative expectations do 
not matter to my choice: I am not motivated to engage in a 
custom by my belief that others are doing it or by my belief that 
others expect me to do it. Instead, I do it because it suits me: I 
believe it serves my purposes. People do not walk on the shady 
side of a street because of what they think others believe or do, 
they do it to stay cool.
Again, notice that this theory uses “custom” in a way that is very different from usual uses of the word: a 
“custom” in this sense is not necessarily a cherished tradition or something that we do self-consciously 
because we think it is “part of our culture.” It is just something we believe is useful.
In almost all scenarios, open defecation is a custom. People defecate in the open, in most instances, 
because they believe that it meets a need to get rid of bodily waste. They prefer to defecate in the 
open because it meets that need. They may have relevant factual beliefs, such as that children’s feces 
are not harmful or that it is too costly to build and maintain a latrine. They may believe that others are 
also defecating in the open, but that empirical expectation does not matter to their choice. Put another 
way, they are not defecating in the open because others are so doing. Rather, they are defecating in the 
open because it is convenient. In some cases, there are other considerations besides convenience.  For 
example, open defecation practices may facilitate certain kinds of social interactions that are also seen 
as useful. 
It is not the case that open defecation is always a custom. However, it is a legitimate default assumption that 
open defecation in many contexts is a custom. The motivational profile captures a large majority of cases.
There are a couple of ways to change customs. First, because customs rely on factual beliefs, you can target 
those factual beliefs. Suppose that people believe that it is too costly to build a latrine but that, in fact, 
there are ways to construct them that are not too costly. You can present individuals with the alternative, 
and, if their behavior is motivated by the belief about cost, change the behavior. Alternatively, you could 
change their personal normative beliefs or create new preferences. This is what marketing attempts to 
do: create new preferences. Or, importantly, you could attempt to create social norms. In a social norm, 
people prefer to engage in some behavior conditional upon their empirical and normative expectations. 
This last method is already an essential part of CLTS interventions.
Occasionally, there are external conditions that produce particular needs or unconditional preferences. 
If it really is too costly to build a latrine or if there are no adequate resources, then people will 
unconditionally prefer to defecate in the open. But that preference could change if those external 
conditions were to change. 
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ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF CUSTOMS
•  “I do it because it meets my needs.”
•  Unconditionally preferred (independent)
•  Social expectations (empirical and normative)  
    don’t matter
 • It meets a need
ESSENTIALS OF DESCRIPTIVE NORMS
 •  “I do it because other people do.”
 •  Conditionally preferred (interdependent)
 •  Empirical expectations matter . . . 
     but normative expectations do not
 •  Coordinate actions with what other people do
1.6.2  Moral Norms
A moral norm is a rule of behavior such that individuals prefer to 
conform to it because it is the right thing to do.
Moral norms are practices we engage in primarily because we 
believe that they are the right thing to do; they are what morality 
demands of us. Like customs, we follow genuinely moral norms 
independently of our social expectations; if we strongly believe 
something is morally right, we should often do it no matter what 
other people do or think. Similarly, if we believe something is morally 
wrong, we should not do it just because other do or because others 
think we should. Moral norms differ from customs because we follow 
them out of a sense of duty rather than a sense of self-interest.
Moral norms are often not relevant to harmful sanitation-related behaviors. The overwhelming majority 
of people are not engaging in open defecation or failing to wash their hands at critical moments because 
they think that open defecation or not washing hands is morally required. 
Attempting to create a moral norm about being open defecation-free or handwashing could be difficult. 
Changing individuals’ moral beliefs is a sensitive and intensive process that has a number of pitfalls. 
Further, most people already have some non-prudential personal normative beliefs that can be leveraged 
to create positive social change. For example, most people have the non-prudential personal normative 
belief that it is morally required to not harm children. What they need is not a change in moral belief but 
a change in factual belief about the relative dangers of open defecation.
1.6.3  Descriptive Norms
A descriptive norm is a pattern of behavior such that individuals 
prefer to conform to it on the condition that they believe most 
people in their reference network conform to it.
Descriptive norms are practices we engage in because, at least 
in part, we want to coordinate what we do with what other 
people in our reference network are doing: “I do it because I 
believe others do the same.” Hence, descriptive norms, unlike 
customs or moral norms, are interdependent: we prefer to 
engage in them only on the condition that we believe others 
are doing the same. They depend, that is, on our empirical 
expectations.
There are a couple of scenarios where empirical expectation matter to choice. The expectations may 
be unilateral. When we imitate others, empirical expectations matter to choice. But those whom we 
imitate are not imitating us back. That is why the expectation is unilateral or “one-way.” By contrast, the 
expectations could be multilateral or “reciprocal.” In such a case, a person engages in some behavior 
because they expect others to do so and vice versa. Consider which side of the road to drive on: everyone 
wants to coordinate with everyone else to drive on one side of the road so that there are no accidents.
11
ESSENTIALS OF MORAL NORMS
•  “I do it because it’s right.”
 •  Unconditionally preferred (independent)
 •  Social expectations 
    (empirical and normative) don’t matter
 •  Believe it’s right
    (Non-prudential personal normative belief)
If open defecation were a descriptive norm, then we should expect that a mere change in empirical 
expectations would be sufficient to bring about the desired change to latrine use. However, we know 
from past experiences that people coming to believe that others are using a latrine is often insufficient 
to bring about positive social change in this regard. That said, there may be some communities in which 
open defecation is a descriptive norm.
1.6.4  Social Norms
A social norm is a rule of behavior such that individuals prefer to 
conform to it on the condition that they believe that most people 
in their reference network conform to it (empirical expectations) 
and most people in the reference network believe that they should 
conform to it (normative expectations).
Social norms are rules of behavior we follow because we believe 
others follow them and because we believe those other people 
think we should follow them too. Social norms, therefore, depend 
on both empirical and normative expectations. Like descriptive 
norms, social norms govern interdependent behavior. But unlike descriptive norms, empirical expectations 
alone are not enough. To prefer to follow a social norm, a person must not only believe that others are doing 
the same; they must also believe that others expect them to conform as well. When following a social norm, 
in part, “I do it because other people expect me to.”
There are many situations in which immediate selfish interests conflict with acting in accordance with 
collective interest. Open defecation may be one of these cases. Even if I see that everyone else is using a 
latrine, I might be very happy to defecate in the open. Others are using latrines; what is the harm in my 
defecating in the open? If enough people think like this, then a community that was open defecation-free 
can revert to open defecation. What can keep the community using latrines in this case is the presence 
of a social norm: "I don’t defecate in the open because I know that all the others think I should not and 
would therefore be angry if I did." This kind of social pressure can be extremely powerful, in both 
beneficial and harmful ways. Social norms often rely upon sanctions, and sanctions can be an indicator 
that a social norm exits. These informal, not legal, sanctions include things like praise, gossip, social 
isolation, and social embarrassment. 
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ESSENTIALS OF SOCIAL NORMS
•  “I do it because other people expect me to.”
•  Conditionally preferred (interdependent)
•  Empirical and normative expectations matter
•  It meets expectations of people in my 
   reference Network
•  Sometimes to avoid sanctions 
   (informal punishments)
SECTION 2: 
Measuring Social Norms
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We have in place the basic building blocks of the theory of social norms along with the diagnostic schema 
for differentiating collective patterns of behavior by their characteristic motivational profiles. Now we turn 
to measurement, which is a crucial part of social norm theory.  Successful sanitation interventions require 
being able to reliably know why people are engaging in harmful collective patterns of behavior. So we must 
be able to measure the behaviors, beliefs, and social expectations of different networks of individuals if we 
wish to have successful and sustainable interventions. 
For more in-depth explanations of the relevant theory and aspects of this section, please see the following:
4C. Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild, Oxford University, Press 2016. Chapter 2.
4Bicchieri, J.W. Lindemans and T. Jiang, “A Structured Approach to the Diagnostic of Collective Practices.”  
     Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 5, December 2014. 
4C. Bicchieri and A. Chavez, “Behaving as Expected: Public Information and Fairness Norms.” 
       Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23 (2): 161-178, 2010.
4C. Bicchieri and E. Xiao, “Do the right thing: but only if others do so.” Journal of Behavioral Decision    
      Making, 22: 191-208, 2009.
2.1  Current Standards in WASH/Sanitation Measurement
Current standards in WASH and sanitation measurement are insufficient to get all the information 
required by the theory of social norms. Although there are some efforts to include social norm and 
motivational questions into existing questionnaires, there is still more work to do.
Current measurement often relies on Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) surveys. These surveys do 
provide some information about empirical expectation and behavioral prevalence but fail to distinguish 
all of the key concepts from section 1. There is also community-led direct monitoring and proxy measure 
evaluation in terms of public health impacts. 
The following subsections provide information about measuring the basic concepts of the theory of 
social norms. The measures should be thought of as supplements to existing measures rather than 
overhauls. Current measures do provide useful information. However, we must also precisely measure 
peoples’ reasons for engaging in harmful collective patterns of behavior if we wish to have a fuller and 
deeper understanding of the target behavior. Further, these additional measures are necessary in order 
to keep separate questions about personal normative beliefs from normative expectation, which current 
surveys often merge. 
CATS and sanitation programming often seeks to create a social norm around latrine use. So we need 
to not only be able to measure what is causing the original harmful collective pattern of behavior, but 
we also must be able to measure when intervention strategies have successfully created a social norm. 
This is key to preventing slippage and maintaining the new positive collective pattern of behavior.
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We must have measures of the following:
4Reference Network
4Behavior
4Factual Beliefs
4Personal Normative Beliefs
4Empirical Expectations
4Normative Expectations
4Belief in the Presence of Sanctions
4Conditionality of Preference
Current measures are sufficient to capture at least some of the above, for example behavior and factual 
beliefs. The sub-sections that follow will focus on particular measures that are important but often not 
captured.
In measuring whether an intervention was successful in promoting a new social norm, we must have 
answers to the following questions:
4Do people expect that others (who matter to them) conform to the specific behavioral rule? That is,   
 do empirical expectations exist?
4Do people expect that others (who matter to them) think they should conform to the specific    
  behavior rule?  That is, do normative expectations exist?
4Is there some form of punishment for those who transgress the rule?
4Is the preference to conform to the specific behavioral rule conditional on those social expectations     
     and sanctions? That is, does a conditional preference to conform exist?
If the answer to all four questions is “yes,” then a social norm exists or has been created. If the answer 
is “no” to any of the four questions, then a social norm does not exist or has not been created.
2.2  Networks 
First and foremost, when we measure expectations it must be clear 
to whom these expectations refer. This is why we need to measure 
reference networks. Social norms are a property of networks, not 
individuals. 
There are three primary methods for uncovering, identifying, and 
measuring networks. The approaches – in descending order of 
both cost but also information about social structure – are the full 
network approach, the snowball approach, and the egocentric 
approach. Each method has particular strengths and weaknesses, although the snowball approach 
strikes a nice balance between cost and information about social structure that suggests it may be 
most practical in many circumstances.
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In each approach, we must first identify the relations that obtain between individuals in a 
particular group. Networks are sets of relations and are built out of “nodes” and “ties” (also 
sometimes called “edges”). Nodes represent individuals or families or villages, depending 
upon the level of analysis. Ties represent relations that obtain between nodes. Ties can be 
“directed” or “undirected.” Directed ties represent one-way relationships. For example, “being 
the son of” is a one-way relation – two individuals cannot each be the son of each other. By 
contrast, undirected ties represent two-way relationships. For example, “uses the same toilet 
as” is a two-way relation – if A uses the same toilet as B, then B uses the same toilet as A.
There are particular networks of interest to sanitation. The first and most obvious is the reference network. 
Again, a reference network is composed of those individuals whose beliefs and behaviors matter to one’s 
choice. In some case these ties will be directed, in others undirected. The second is the trust network, which 
also varies by whether it is directed or not. The information-sharing relation is also important. Finally, 
there will be particular relations that are of interest with respect to a target behavior. For example, when 
considering open defecation, “uses the same toilet as” is an important relation. 
In the full network approach, an experimenter surveys everyone in a population. They ask to each individual 
the questions of interest. And, importantly, they ask everyone in the target population the same questions 
at once. From there, they can use answers to generate the network. For example:
4Who might be disappointed if you defecate in the open?
4Whose opinion do you respect?
4Who do you talk to daily?
4Who uses the same toilet as you?
The full network approach is the costliest but most complete approach. Because it is so resource and 
labor intensive, it is likely a poor fit for measuring large populations. However, it may be appropriate in 
small villages. 
In the snowball approach, an experimenter asks one or a small number of people whatever questions 
they have. As the respondents list other people in their responses, the experimenter then goes to those 
individuals and surveys them as well. The experimenter stops surveying individuals either when they stop 
getting new people or when they decide that they have enough data to map the network.
This method has the benefit that it is not as costly and resource-intensive as the full network approach. 
However, the snowball approach is less informative of social structure than the full network approach 
because the experimenter is not capturing the information of everyone in the population. The experi-
menter will have to make inferences from the survey group to the general population. This is the case 
when a network is disconnected. In a connected network, there is a path from each node to any other 
node in the network. In a disconnected network, there is not a path from each node to any other node. 
“Paths” are a measure of distance between nodes. 
A network is not “good” because it is connected or “bad” because it is disconnected. It depends on 
the particular relation that the ties represent in the network. “Trust” may be a good relation to have in a 
connected network, while “uses the same toilet as” may potentially be bad since a connected network that 
uses the same toilet represents a situation where everyone is using the same (perhaps few) resources. 
That said, if you are dealing with a disconnected network (with respect to say, the information-sharing 
relation), the snowball method may risk missing out on components of a disconnected networks. On 
the other hand, the snowball approach can be useful for tracking down sub-populations within larger 
populations. When using a snowball approach, it is therefore crucial that you are sampling from multiple 
parts of the population to make sure that you are hitting all relevant sections of a network, regardless of 
whether the network is connected or disconnected. Careful choice of starting points in the initial survey 
is crucial.
In the egocentric approach, an experimenter surveys a group of individuals with a set of questions. 
For example, a surveyor may ask, “Whose opinion do you respect?” or “Who do you talk to daily?” The 
experimenter then asks the same questions to the same individuals, but this time the questions are about 
their friends. For example, “Of those whose opinions you respect, whose opinions do they respect?” or 
“Of those you talk to daily, who do they talk to daily?” And so on. Unlike the snowball approach, the 
experimenter does not then go to the individuals the respondents listed.
This approach is the least informative of social structure of the three. People may know who they trust 
but are more likely to be mistaken about who those people trust. But the method is also cheap since the 
experimenter is not asking the questions to many individuals in the network. In a large city, the egocentric 
approach may be useful. If repeated, the method may identify natural opinion leaders (if, for example, the 
responses frequently draw out particular individuals as salient in the network). The egocentric approach 
does reveal, however, information on who influences the specific respondent (or, at least, who they 
perceive as having influence upon them).
2.3  Behavior
There are two primary ways of measuring behavior: monitors and self-reports. Each has costs and benefits, 
although self-reports are often the better of the two options.
A primary problem in the measurement of behavior – especially private behaviors and potentially 
embarrassing behaviors – is that people may give untruthful answers. Social desirability bias refers to 
the phenomenon of people giving answers that they think are socially acceptable (rather than truthful 
answers). Acting on the bias, respondents may give answers they think the inquirer seeks, wants, or 
finds acceptable.  Monitors – whether direct monitors or through indirect proxies – are not subject to 
such self-report biases. However, monitoring can be difficult (if not impossible for private behaviors), 
may influence the behavior measured, is often expensive, and is hard to scale. Moreover, monitoring 
of, say, latrine use has precision issues. It is hard to track frequency of use, as well as the identity of those 
using a particular latrine. 
Because of this, self-reports are often the better solution. Self-reports are relatively cheap (compared to 
monitoring), easy to administer and easy to scale. One problem with self-reports concerns the wording 
of questions to make sure that you are isolating the same target phenomena. For example, if we want to 
compare different survey instruments, we must be sure they are measuring the same thing. There is also 
the concern about social desirability bias.
Wording is also subject to interpretation. Consider questions from two household surveys about 
sanitation. In a Sanitation Program at Scale in Pakistan Knowledge, Attitude and Practice Household 
Survey Evaluation Question, respondents were asked “Where to you/your household members defecate? 
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(Latrine, Open, Both)."  In a WASH Sustainability Action Plan Household Survey Question, respondents 
were asked, “Are there family members who do not always use the latrine? (Yes, No).” Although these 
questions seem similar, they are actually asking about different things. The first question bundles 
together a question about personal behavior with empirical expectations about household members 
and is relatively open with respect to its answer. The second question concerns family members and 
asks whether there is any family member who defecates in the open at least once. These are different 
questions about potentially different people. And differences in responses to these questions may just 
be due to wording. If using different questions, experiments are necessary to determine the consistency of 
the wording in triangulating on the same target phenomena.
There are three different ways to try to address concerns about social desirability bias that do not put 
responders in an awkward or embarrassing position.
The first is to normalize the behavior through the wording of the question. The idea is to remove or minimize 
the social stigma from whatever target behavior we ask about. So, for example, a survey may ask about 
latrine use and normalize the behavior as follows: “In this village, some people use a latrine and some 
people do not. How often do you use a latrine?”
A second option is to use a randomized response technique. This method shields the true response from 
the experimenter, and the idea is that this frees individuals to self-report accurately. For example, we may 
ask the question: “Do you ever defecate in the open?” The responder is told to secretly select a side of a 
coin, heads or tails, and then toss the coin. If the side they secretly picked comes up, they must say they 
practice open defecation. Otherwise, they must tell the truth. In this case, the response is completely 
private because the experimenter cannot know why the respondent said that they engaged in open 
defecation (it could be true, or it could be the result of the coin toss). However, the experimenter can 
infer about behavioral prevalence from the community-wide statistic by accounting for approximately 
half the respondents stating they openly defecate as a result of the coin flip.
A third option is to anonymize responses. Respondents anonymously write answers on a piece of paper 
that they drop in a box. Or, for less literate groups, experimenters can use objects that signal the behavior.
2.4  Empirical Expectations
Measuring empirical expectations is a two-step process. First, you must measure the prevalence of the 
behavior (see the previous section). Second, you must measure empirical expectations about that behavior.
The second step is to measure empirical expectations. There is no way to measure empirical expectations 
except through self-report measures. Remember that empirical expectations are beliefs about how 
others in the reference network act. Therefore, questions measuring empirical expectations must first 
attach the question to the relevant reference network and then ask the respondent about his or her 
expectation of the behavior of that particular group of people.
For example: “Out of 10 other people surveyed, how many do you think engage in open defecation?”
Note that the question specifies the people or group (the 10 other people surveyed) and then further 
specifies the behavior (open defecation). These two elements must be specified to measure the empirical 
expectations about who is doing what. The question could also be asked in different ways – say, targeting 
percentages – if the population is numerically literate enough.
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The important thing is to elicit accurate empirical expectations. “Accuracy” here does not refer to 
respondents correctly guessing how many relevant others engage in the target behavior. Rather, “accuracy” 
refers to respondents providing their genuine empirical expectations regardless of whether those empirical 
expectations are correct. People may have confused ideas about the behaviors of others. Or people may not 
seriously consider the question when it is posed to them. Or, again, there is the problem of social desirability 
bias, where respondents may not give accurate representations of their empirical expectations because of 
potential shame or embarrassment.
For these reasons, among others, we strongly suggest incentivizing answers to empirical expectations. 
This document discusses potential problems and worries about incentives later in the measurement 
sub-section on pitfalls. For now, let us focus on how to use incentives.
In cases where behavior has already been measured, experimenters can incentivize answers to empirical 
expectations. For example, respondents can be told “If you correctly guess how many out of 10 people 
surveyed engage in open defecation, you get a reward.” The incentive works as a mechanism to get 
people to focus on what they expect other people to do. If the incentive works correctly, then people will 
be more motivated to give an answer that genuinely reflects their considered judgment on how many 
others are engaging in the behavior.
2.5  Normativity
Given that behavior and empirical expectations have been measured, now we need to measure normative 
expectations. Remember that normative expectations are beliefs about relevant others’ personal normative 
beliefs. Hence measuring normative expectations, as in the case of measuring empirical expectations, is a 
two-step process. First, we measure the personal normative beliefs of the target population. Then, measure 
expectations about those beliefs – normative expectations. As in the case of empirical expectations, 
measuring personal normative beliefs and measuring normative expectation require self-reports and 
cannot be measured through monitors.
2.5.1  Personal Normative Beliefs
Remember that personal normative beliefs are beliefs about what people should do. In measuring personal 
normative beliefs, it is important to focus on non-prudential personal normative beliefs. A collective practice 
supported by prudential beliefs can be much easier to change either through information campaigns or by 
changing facts on the ground. Here is an example of the difference between the two:
4Prudential: I think people should use a toilet because it is safer than defecating in the open.
4Non-Prudential: I think people should use a toilet because it is the right thing to do.
It is important to focus on non-prudential personal normative beliefs, and it is possible to isolate them in 
self-reports. For example:
4Q1: Do you believe that people in your village should use a latrine? 
	 1	Yes
	 1	No (Skip Next Question)
4Q2: Why do you think people in your village should use a latrine?
 1	Because it is the right thing to do
 1	Other reasons
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Most surveys do not clearly distinguish personal normative beliefs from attitudes, personal normative 
beliefs from normative expectations, and prudential personal normative beliefs from non-prudential 
personal normative beliefs. This is one of the major limitations of existing measures.
Most surveys measure ‘attitudes’ and not ‘personal normative beliefs’ specifically. Remember that attitudes 
reflect evaluations of people, objects and actions. Personal normative beliefs about what you should do 
may give rise to feelings of like or dislike (e.g., “I like to defecate in the open”), but personal normative beliefs 
should not be confused with such feelings!
There is still a remaining worry here about social desirability bias and eliciting accurate representations 
of personal normative beliefs. There is no way to incentivize questions about personal normative beliefs 
(as there is no way to independently monitor them), but experimenters can apply the same anonymizing 
techniques (normalizing, anonymous answers, randomization) as in the behavioral measures.
Finally, experimenters can use multiple questions to target personal normative beliefs. For example:
4Q1: Do you believe that people should defecate in the open because it is the right thing to do?
4Q2: Do you think it is wrong to defecate in the open?
4Q3: Do you approve of open defecation?
By taking the average response across a variety of questions, experimenters can reduce noise from both 
the questions and the participant response, thereby increasing reliability.
2.5.2  Normative Expectations
The steps for measuring normative expectations are similar to the steps for measuring empirical 
expectations. Remember that normative expectations are beliefs about other people’s personal 
normative beliefs. Using the data about personal normative beliefs we collected, experimenters 
can measure normative expectations about the reference network’s personal normative beliefs. 
For example:
4Q: Out of 10 other people surveyed, how many do you think said that one should use a latrine because it  
     is the right thing to do?
As in the case with empirical expectations, experimenters can incentivize answers to elicit accurate 
representations of normative expectations. Again, the important thing is not that normative expectations 
and personal normative beliefs match; rather, the important thing is eliciting accurate representation of 
people’s normative expectations. Normative expectations can be correct or incorrect. And experimenters 
need to know whether the target population has correct normative expectations for planning successful 
intervention strategies.
An alternative to directly measuring normative expectations is to measure belief in sanctions. Measuring 
beliefs about sanctions can be a proxy for measuring normative expectations, as sanction often result from 
violations of normative expectations. For example:
4Q: What do you think would happen in your community if it were discovered that someone was   
     engaging in open defecation?
If the answer is that there would be some form of social punishment (shaming, ridicule, isolation, and so 
on), this signals the probable existence of normative expectations.
2.6  Conditionality of Preference
The previously discussed measures are necessary but insufficient to establish the presence of a social 
norm. For example, we may discover that in the target population there are mutually consistent 
normative expectations – that is, everyone thinks that everyone else thinks that everyone should use 
a latrine. We cannot infer from this data that a social norm exists! There could be a shared moral or 
religious norm, where everyone has correct normative expectations about others’ personal normative 
beliefs, but the personal normative beliefs of each individual are (by themselves) driving the behavior. 
In that case, we do not have conditional preferences. Rather, each individual has an unconditional 
preference to engage in the behavior (for moral or religious reasons). This behavior is independent 
rather than interdependent or social because even though everyone has the accurate normative 
expectation that others expect them to behave in this way, the normative expectation is motivationally 
inert. Therefore, it is critical to measure whether conditional preferences exist in the population or, in 
other words, whether behaviors are interdependent. 
Notice in the case above, while you have measured the normative expectation and you have measured 
the behavior you cannot say whether the social expectation caused the behavior. To establish the causal 
claim, you need to imagine what would happen if the normative expectation did not exist. If you removed or 
changed the normative expectation, would people behave in the same way? If so as in the example above, 
the expectation does not cause the behavior. In the case, however, that removing or changing the norma-
tive expectation also removes or changes the behavior, we can say that the behavior (causally) depends 
on the expectation. This kind of dependence is called counterfactual dependence. To put the point more 
formally, A causes B when (1) in all the cases where you find A you also find B and (2) counter to that fact if 
hypothetically A did not occur in those cases neither would B (assuming B has no other sufficient causes). 
In the case of social norms, behavior will only be caused by social expectations when those social 
expectations are also accompanied by conditional preferences. That is, if people have a conditional 
preference to behave in accordance with social expectations, then they will behave one way when the 
social expectations exist and behave another way when they do not. The behavior will be interdependent 
since it is conditioned on the expectation of what others do or believe. Put differently, how can 
experimenters know that the social expectation in question has a causal influence on the observed 
behavior? This is the same thing as asking, “Do people have conditional preferences?”
The challenge in measuring conditional preferences comes from trying to capture how people would 
behave if counter to the fact they held different beliefs or expectations. If a social expectation has causal 
influence on behavior, it must be the case that – were the expectation absent or different – the preference 
(and behavior) would be different. Since someone cannot simply change his or her expectations at 
will, we have to use some hypothetical manipulations in our survey questions. For example, if I know 
that you defecate in the open and that you also expect a majority of community members to defecate 
in the open, I may want to ask you to entertain a hypothetical scenario in which a majority of community 
members now uses latrines, and ask you what, in that case, you would do. If you tell me that in this new 
scenario  you would also use a latrine, I can conclude that your preference for latrine use is conditional 
on the empirical expectation that most others use latrines. 
There are two ways of measuring conditionality of preference. First, experimenters can directly ask 
hypothetical questions to respondents. Second, experimenters can use vignettes. Each has costs and 
benefits, but vignettes are typically the better solution.
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Direct hypotheticals ask respondents what they would do if their empirical and/or normative expectations 
were to change. For example:
DIRECT HYPOTHETHICALS
It can be difficult for people to entertain hypothetical questions. This difficulty can be amplified when 
people are asked to answer hypothetical questions involving people acting and believing in a way 
counter to known facts. When people have difficulty conceptualizing or answering a question, they are 
much more likely to give an answer that does not indicate their true view of the matter.
For these reasons, vignettes are often a better solution. Vignettes are short stories about imaginary 
characters and scenarios. By slightly changing the circumstances from scenario to scenario – in particular, 
by varying social expectations – an experimenter can identify whether social expectations matter to the 
behavior of the respondent. Vignettes ask respondents what they think the fictional character will do 
in each situation. Because the question is not self-relevant, people are more willing to answer honestly. 
And if the character has sufficient similarity to the respondent, then the answers can be taken as 
representative of the respondent’s true view. Thus, if the respondent answers in a way that indicates 
the character has a conditional preference, they likely do as well.
VIGNETTES
Low Empirical, Low Normative: Shahid lives in a nearby 
village. In the past, no one in his village used a toilet, 
including Shahid. Shahid has learned that few people 
in his village use a toilet, and few say that you should 
use a toilet. In this case, what would Shahid do?
Low Empirical, High Normative: Shahid lives in a 
nearby village. In the past, no one in his village used a 
toilet, including Shahid. Shahid has learned that few 
people in his village use a toilet, but at the same time, 
almost all now say that you should use a toilet. In 
this case, what would Shahid do?
High Empirical, Low Normative: Shahid lives in a 
nearby village. In the past, no one in his village used 
a toilet, including Shahid. Shahid has learned that 
almost all people in his village now use a toilet, 
but at the same time, few say that you should use 
a toilet. In this case, what would Shahid do?
High Empirical, High Normative: Shahid lives in a 
nearby village. In the past, no one in his village used 
a toilet,including Shahid. Shahid has learned that 
almost all people in his village now use a toilet, 
and almost all now say that you should use a toilet. 
In this case, what would Shahid do?
Low Empirical, Low Normative: Imagine that few 
people in your village use a toilet, and few say that 
one should use a toilet. In this case, what would 
you do?
Low Empirical, High Normative: Imagine that few 
people in your village use a toilet, but at the same 
time, almost all say that one should use a toilet. 
In this case, what would you do?
High Empirical, Low Normative: Imagine that almost 
all people in your village use a toilet, but at the same 
time, few say that one should use a toilet. In this case, 
what would you do?
High Empirical, High Normative: Imagine that almost 
all people in your village use a toilet, and almost all 
say that one should use a toilet.  In this case, what 
would you do?
2.7  Pitfalls
All of the potential pitfalls have been previously mentioned, but it is important to reiterate common traps 
and their solutions.
2.7.1  Comprehension
The experimenters seek to answer particular questions. They need to know the relevant networks, 
whether empirical expectations exist, whether normative expectations exist, and whether preferences 
are conditional. Do not mistake the questions that specialists need answers to for the questions that 
should be asked of a target population. It is important to work locally with knowledgeable individuals 
to develop questions that are comprehensible to the target population. The questions asked of the target 
population should, when analyzed, be able to help the experimenter answer his or her questions. Keep 
in mind that the target population’s comprehension will vary along multiple dimensions.
2.7.2  Social Desirability Bias
Social desirability bias is an ever-present threat to all self-report measures. Make sure to take steps to 
minimize or eliminate the potential for such bias. The use of anonymizing techniques – such as nor-
malization, randomization and anonymous responses – greatly reduces the potential for such bias. 
2.7.3  Incentives
There is an ongoing debate in the sanitation community about the appropriateness and role of incen-
tives in self-report measurement. Penn SONG supports the use of incentives where appropriate and 
useful. But it is important to note that the incentives should be tailored to the context and should 
be just large enough to prime respondents to give accurate answers representing their beliefs and 
expectations. An incentive that is not well-calibrated to the target population will not do the work 
that the incentive is supposed to do (and this holds whether the incentive is too small or too large). 
Local knowledge about what would count as an appropriate incentive is crucial.
2.7.4  When to Measure
It is important to measure at each step of programming, from baseline diagnostics to midpoint to 
end cycle and, potentially, beyond. Of course, frequency of measurement will depend, in part, on 
practical conditions and funding. However, if there is no reliable measurement at the various stages 
of diagnosis, monitoring and evaluation, or if the measures are not consistent across time, this greatly 
limits any inference we can draw from the collected data.
2.8  Analyzing Results and Making Inferences
With measures of networks, behavior, beliefs, social expectations, and conditionality of preference, 
practitioners can analyze the data and draw certain inferences.
If the data reveal that there is no conditionality of preference, then practitioners can validly infer that 
the target behavior is not interdependent, and certainly not a social norm. This is already clear from 
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the diagnostic schema. If further data show that people do not have a non-prudential personal normative 
belief concerning the target behavior, then practitioners can validly infer that the target behavior is 
a custom. If data reveal that there is conditionality of preference but only with respect to empirical 
expectations, then practitioners can validly infer that the target behavior is a descriptive norm. Finally, 
if data reveal conditionality of preference with respect to both empirical and normative expectations, 
then practitioners can validly infer the presence of a social norm.
There are other inferences that the data allow to be validly drawn. Suppose that there is a high level of 
normative expectation coupled with a personal normative belief that latrine use should happen but that 
many people are still practicing open defecation. This suggests that the problem is not motivational. 
Rather, this suggests that there is some sort of supply or technical problem. Remember again that there 
are extra-social factors that can sometimes drive harmful patterns of behavior. 
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SECTION 3: 
Norm Creation
For many harmful sanitation-related collective patterns of behavior, the creation of a social norm is a 
strong solution to the problem behavior. The next couple of sub-sections will detail traditional approaches 
to bringing about social change and discuss their related pitfalls. After that, the sub-sections will argue 
for an integrated approach that focuses on people’s reasons for engaging in harmful sanitation-related 
behaviors with specific reference to CLTS programming.
For more in-depth explanations of the relevant theory and aspects of this section, please see the following:
4C. Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild, Oxford University Press, 2016. Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
4Bicchieri and H. Mercier, “Norms and beliefs: How change occurs” in M. Xenitidou & B. Edmonds (eds.)   
     The Complexity of Social Norms. Springer International Publishing, 2014. Chapter 2.
3.1  Traditional Approaches to Social Change
There are three main traditional approaches to social change: legal, informational, and economic. Each 
has associated costs and benefits, but all are unlikely to be successful in isolation.
3.1.1  Legal
One typical approach to changing behavior it to introduce legislation to outlaw it. However, the law is a 
blunt instrument and not always effective at producing the desired social change. In particular, the greater 
the distance from the law to the custom, the less likely people will follow or enforce the law.
When a law is closer to the custom, it can more effectively motivate behavioral change. This is the thought 
behind the “nudge” strategy to get people to opt into positive patterns of behavior. In addition, new 
laws can signal new personal normative beliefs and possibly affect normative expectations of those 
engaging in the harmful collective pattern of behavior. After all, clearly some people disapprove of the 
practice if they introduced and passed legislation to legally sanction it.
At the same time, though, this is often a fraught strategy. Existing trust in the government is important, 
and if people do not already trust the government, the new law could be seen as illegitimate. Moreover, 
if the legislators who pass the law are not themselves members of the reference network of the target 
population, the law could be seen as an outside intrusion or interference. The downside from this 
intervention could potentially be serious: a custom could turn into a social norm and serve as an in-
group signal, which would be dire from an intervention perspective. Finally, laws require enforcement. 
However, the police and other authorities are themselves part of reference networks that may be 
engaging in the custom the law seeks to eliminate. If authorities themselves do not endorse the content 
of the law, then they are significantly less likely to enforce the law.
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3.1.2  Informational
Another common approach to changing harmful behavior is to provide information about the problems 
associated with the practice. For example, there are many public health campaigns that stress the negative 
public health impacts of open defecation or failure to hand wash. 
Informational campaigns, in isolation, often do not work. First, the informational campaigns are often 
statistical in nature, which makes it difficult for less numerically literate people to grasp the nature 
of the public health threat. In addition, informational campaigns have often used sanitized language 
(think “feces” versus “shit”) that fails to connect emotionally with the target populations. Finally, 
information campaigns target individual beliefs and preferences – often factual beliefs and prudential 
personal normative beliefs. Often, they do not target social expectations. But if the goal is to create a 
positive social norm around latrine use, targeting factual beliefs alone is, in principle, a failed strategy. 
3.1.3  Economic
The final traditional approach to social change is economic incentives. This approach has had inconsistent 
results, positive in some context and negative in others. 
One acute problem with an approach that uses economic incentives only is that such incentives can 
crowd out intrinsic motivation. That is, the financial motivation can come to swamp the moral and 
social motivations that might otherwise be appealed to. Further, economic incentives can create a 
pricing effect: when behavior has a price, then paying a fine may reset that price. For example, assume 
that there is a small fine for open defecation behavior. If the fine is low enough, the behavior could be 
interpreted as “not that bad.” If it were “really bad”, there would be a heavier penalty!  So a person is 
put in the position to choose between whether to engage in open defecation (and pay the fine) or use 
the latrine (and deal with the associated costs of latrine building and maintenance). A cost-benefit 
calculation may favor open defecation. Allowing this kind of choice creates a space and incentive for 
backsliding.
That said, economic incentives can play a useful role in promoting positive social change. If there 
is a temporally-specific and action-specific incentive for some behavior, it is possible to motivate the 
behavior by changing its costs and benefits. But, then again, if people are opting in to the positive 
behavior for the purpose of securing an economic incentive and the economic incentive stops, then 
what motivation will people have to resist falling into the old harmful behavior?
3.2  CLTS and the Social Norms Approach to Sanitation Programming
At this point, we have the basic building blocks of the theory – independent and interdependent 
behaviors, factual and personal normative beliefs, empirical expectations and normative expectations, 
conditional and unconditional preferences, and reference networks. We have learned how to use the 
basic building blocks to diagnose social practices into customs, moral norms, descriptive norms, and 
social norms. We have learned how to precisely measure the basic building blocks in order to diagnose 
and then draw valid inferences from data patterns. And we have looked at traditional approaches to 
social change, noting both their strengths and their weaknesses. Now we will put all of this together to 
think about how to change harmful collective patterns of behavior. When we create programs to bring 
about social change with respect to sanitation-related behaviors, what works? And why?
The social norms approach emphasizes the ways in which so many behaviors are interdependent: they 
depend on our beliefs about what others do and think. Even when confronting a harmful independent 
behavior, like a custom, the best solution may be to create a new social norm against the practice. 
For example, open defecation in most contexts is a custom (people do it mostly because it meets 
their needs, rather than in response to social expectations), but UNICEF WASH has, in many cases, 
successfully brought about change in this practice by creating a social norm against open defecation. 
Community members stop engaging in open defecation because they come to believe that others do 
not defecate in the open and because they believe that others think that they should not defecate in 
the open. Because social change is so often interdependent in this way, the social norms approach em-
phasizes the importance of programs that engage the entire relevant community together, rather than 
ones that target people at just an individual level – as the traditional legal, informational and economic 
approaches do.
The following sub-sections concern common features of norm creation: presence of negative exter-
nalities, collective action problems, shared reasons to change behavior, agreed upon sanctions, and 
collective change of expectations.
3.2.1  Presence of Negative Externalities
An externality is a loss or gain in the welfare of one party resulting from the activity of another party without 
the possibility of compensation. Norms often emerge when individual actions create externalities – that 
is, when individual actions have a positive or negative impact on others. 
Externalities are associated with public goods. A public good is a good that is non-rival and non-excludable. 
“Non-rival” means that the consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce the availability of 
the good for consumption by others. “Non-excludable” means that no one can effectively be excluded from 
using the good.
Public health is a public good. No one can be excluded from the good effectively, and “consumption” 
of public health by one individual does not reduce the availability of public health for others.
Open defecation creates negative externalities. Everyone benefits from hygienic sanitation practices. 
Safely managed sanitation is a public good.
How can a public good be provided? Classical solutions involve creating property rights or imposing 
individual contributions (such as through taxation). But social norms can also provide a public good by 
aligning individual and collective interests. That is, social norms can motivate people to provide public 
goods, and naturally-evolving social norms often do just that. However, it is possible to create new 
social norms in response to the lack of public goods resulting from collective action problems.
3.2.2  Collective Action Problems
In sanitation, all have to cooperate in order to obtain a clean environment and public health. But it might 
not be in a person’s self-interest to contribute their share to the public good. If everyone else uses a 
latrine, then an individual’s contribution is unnecessary for providing the public good, and the individual 
benefits from the clean environment anyway. However, if most people are defecating in the open and not 
enough are using latrines so as to provide the public good, then an individual’s contribution will not be 
sufficient to provide the public good (because it cannot produce it alone), and the individual incurs the 
costs associated with latrines without receiving the public health benefit. In either case, an individual has 
an incentive to defecate in the open.
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Controlled laboratory experiments on public goods show that most people are conditional cooperators. 
An initial high level of cooperation declines rapidly as individuals defect – that is, empirical expectations 
matter for the provision of public goods. Moreover, introducing punishment keeps cooperation levels 
high – that is, normative expectations matter for the provision of public goods.
3.2.3  Shared Reasons to Change Behavior and Collective Decision to Change
Suppose, though, that people acquire shared reasons to change their customary behavior. Are such 
reasons sufficient to motivate change? Why is there a need to introduce sanctions?
Think here of CLTS programming. What do CLTS interventions do when they are successful? That is, what 
causes their success?
The theory of social norms and the Handbook on Community Led Total Sanitation both answer that 
CLTS is successful because it gives communities shared reasons to change. 
Consider the different strategies for the triggering stage. During a well-crafted CLTS intervention, the 
facilitator guides a community that has natural leaders who are already willing to change in some way. 
The transect walk elicits strong emotions such as disgust and shame. But it also serves to collectively 
inform people about the problems associated with open defecation and the advantages of latrine use or 
being open defecation free. Because people already have a strong aversion to and personal normative belief 
against eating the feces of others, CLTS leverages that pre-existing aversion and personal normative 
belief. The transect walk serves as a mechanism by which people can come to understand that their 
practice of open defection leads to fecal contamination, which in turn undermines the public goods of 
sanitation and health.
Importantly, everyone can see that everyone else is updating their factual beliefs at the same time. Because 
the actions related to being open defecation free are interdependent (based on social expectations), 
factual and personal normative belief change must be collective. And people should be aware that their 
peers’ personal normative beliefs are changing alongside their own. This in turn creates new normative 
expectations in the target population. Remember again that normative expectations are beliefs about 
others’ personal normative beliefs. People can see that their peers are coming to view open defecation 
as dangerous (update of factual beliefs) and to believe that people should not be defecating in the open 
(update of personal normative beliefs). This in turn causes a collective update of normative expectations, 
for everyone can directly observe that everyone else thinks that people should not defecate in the open.
However, even if members of a reference network acquire shared reasons to change, having shared 
reasons for change is not enough. There must be a coordinated and collective decision to change. CLTS 
leaves open to community members whether to abandon open defecation. But when the triggering 
works well, community members, through collective discussions, come to the decision to abandon 
the practice. In good cases, trusted leaders and natural leaders facilitate these discussions, leading to 
a collective pledge to move toward being open defecation free. In good cases, the development of the 
action plan is “owned” by the community, and there is implementation of change by the entire community. 
Also, community monitoring systems, like village spot maps or colorful flags to mark houses, can be used 
to reinforce empirical expectations.
Of course, these are the good cases where there is enough trust in the community that such cooperation 
is possible. Sometimes the whole community may not agree to abandon open defecation. Coordination 
toward the positive behavior may be partially effective or may occur in starts and stops. In such cases, 
multiple points of coordination with multiple intervention strategies may be necessary.
3.2.4  Agreed Upon Sanctions
The function of agreed upon sanctions is to create or reinforce normative expectations about acceptable 
behavior with respect to sanitation and to clearly mark the consequences for transgressions.
The community itself decides collectively which sanctions to enact on transgressors. There may also 
be a role for either the community or the sanitation specialists or the government to create positive 
rewards for communities, creating a positive competition between communities to reach a new and 
positive pattern of behavior. This is arguably what ODF certification provides when it works well. 
Sanctions strengthen normative expectations during the triggering and post-triggering phases. Agreed 
upon community punishment help disseminate the community’s normative message that people should 
use a latrine because it is desirable for both one’s own and others’ well-being. Moreover, punishment 
Cristina Bicchieri@University of Pennsylvania 9
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(when publicly implemented) promotes the targeted behavior to both those punished and to third-party 
observers. And, in general, new behaviors are more readily obeyed when they are made salient, which 
punishments do.
The sanctions, to be legitimate, must be agreed upon by the individuals in the community. Individuals 
must have the opportunity to take part in the decision-making process, to present their arguments, to be 
listened to, to having their views considered, and so on. In the good case, punishment is consensual, 
which increases the perception of fairness of enforcement and the likelihood of complying with the 
good social norm.
Finally, remember again that sanitation poses a social dilemma. There is the temptation to take advantage 
of the fact that everyone else is using latrines by not using one. Punishment serves as a further mechanism 
to prevent backsliding into the harmful old practice, but it must be community-led and constantly 
reinforced, especially in the early period of the emerging social norm.
3.2.5  Collective Change of Expectations
When there are shared reasons to change and a collective decision to change along with community
led sanctions, there should be compliance with the new social norm. The emergence of the new 
behavior – driven by new normative expectations – will lead to updated empirical expectations, that 
in turn strengthen normative expectations, that in turn strengthen empirical expectations . . . and so 
on. The normative expectation that all believe that all should use and maintain latrines drives the 
empirical expectation that all are using latrines, and vice versa, creating a virtuous feedback loop or 
cycle. This is the key to sustainability, at least motivationally.
COMMON FEATURES OF NORM CREATION
Presence of negative externality
Collective action problem (conflict between individual and collective interest)
 Shared reasons to change behavior (awareness of negative externalities)
Agreed upon sanctions (create normative expectations about acceptable behavior and the 
consequences of transgressions)
Collective change of expectations (observe that one’s reference network has changed behavior)
3.3  Slippage and Sustainability
Slippage and sustainability are key concerns in sanitation programming. Practitioners need to know when 
slippage is acceptable and when it is not. 
 
After a successful intervention, compliance with new social norms of latrine use and maintenance will be 
high. Some erosion is acceptable, such as the natural erosion that can occur when there are newcomers 
to the community or collapse of sanitation facilities. But some erosion is unacceptable: this is a 
drop-out effect due to non-adherence to the new social norm.
Slippage and Sustainability
Therese Dooley (UNICEF Regional Adviser for South Asia), “Scaling up CATS Lessons Learned” presented at the National Rural Water 
Supply, Sanitation and Irrigation Program (Ru-WatSTIP) held by the Islamic Republic of Aghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & 
Development (MRRD) http://www.mrrd-ru-watsip.org/afcosan-i/
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Slippage and Sustainability
Therese Dooley (UNICEF Regional Adviser for South Asia), “Scaling up CATS Lessons Learned” presented at the National Rural Water 
Supply, Sanitation and Irrigation Program (Ru-WatSTIP) held by the Islamic Republic of Aghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & 
Development (MRRD) http://www.mrrd-ru-watsip.org/afcosan-i/
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Slippage and Sustainability
Therese Dooley (UNICEF Regional Adviser for South Asia), “Scaling up CATS Lessons Learned” presented at the National Rural Water 
Supply, Sanitation and Irrigation Program (Ru-WatSTIP) held by the Islamic Republic of Aghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & 
Development (MRRD) http://www.mrrd-ru-watsip.org/afcosan-i/
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What could be the causes of such a drop-out effect? The theory of social norms, as well as Penn SONG’s 
involvement with the UNICEF Pakistan WASH Sustainability Check Study, provide some insights.
First, it is important to know whether the community was truly “open defecation free” in the first place. 
There can be some variance in what counts as “open defecation free” in different contexts. But also, 
importantly, good and accurate measurement is crucial. Were there sufficient measures of behavior, 
the presence of empirical expectations, normative expectations, and conditionality of preference?
Are there community-established sanctions that are well-known and understood by members of the 
reference network? Is there a community-wide commitment to actually follow through with sanctions? 
A community pledge to become open defecation free is not sufficient to establish that an intervention 
has successfully created a social norm, which is key to sustainable behavior. 
Second, did normative expectations persist post-triggering? Normative expectations can start high, but 
as we have already seen when discussing public good experiments, observed deviation from the norm 
will weaken normative expectations over time. 
This relates to the third point: did people believe that sanctions or punishments were likely to occur for 
norm violations? If people do not believe that the sanctions or punishments represent credible threats, 
then there is the space for individual incentives to deviate from the norm or backslide into harmful 
behavior.
The UNICEF Pakistan WASH Sustainability Check investigated communities certified open defecation 
free and rural water supply schemes, among many other sanitation-related behaviors. The former 
investigated households’ exclusive use of latrines, while the latter investigated households paying 
to access a community water supply scheme. The check showed that although there were moderate 
normative expectations around exclusive use of latrines, there were low beliefs in sanctions as well 
as low latrine use rates and low empirical expectations. If there is a low belief in the possibility of 
punishment, then low latrine use rate and low empirical expectations are predictable.
The key to sustainable sanitation social norms is high normative expectations coupled with high belief in 
sanctions. Under good conditions, these drive behavior and new empirical expectations. But when belief 
in sanctions falters, the space has been opened for transgressing behavior, which can undermine and 
unacceptably erode the positive but fragile social norm.
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SECTION 4: 
Parting Thought: 
The Limits of the Social Norm Approach
The theory of social norms and the social norm approach to social change are valuable tools to add to the 
practitioner’s toolkit. But the theory of social norms is just one tool among many to bring about positive 
change with respect to sanitation-related behavior. However valuable the tool, it is not a panacea.
There are a number of non-social factors that prevent positive social change. There are supply problems 
with respect to latrine ownership. There are legal, technological, and economic, and political constraints 
that make promotion of good sanitation difficult in some contexts. Another way to put the point: we must 
recognize that not all bottlenecks are behavioral or social or motivational.
Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), "The Diagram." SFD Promotion Initiative: i, 2016. http://sfd.
susana.org/sfd-worldwide/cities/50
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Promoting sanitation is not merely a matter of getting everyone to believe that everyone believes that 
everyone should use a latrine. Maintaining conditions of sanitation or being open defecation free involves 
many steps that go beyond merely getting people to use latrines.
That said, many of the same lessons that apply to CLTS interventions and creating the demand for 
sanitation, latrines, public health, and so on cross-apply to creating and maintaining demands for 
increased access to the other conditions necessary for promoting sanitation. 
One point of debate currently among sanitation specialists concerns the role of economic subsidies in 
providing latrines and other supplies. While it is beyond the scope of this document to fully investigate 
the matter, the social norm approach recognizes the valuable role that economic subsidies can 
sometimes play in promoting positive social change. All the social expectations in the world are not 
going to provide people with the material means necessary for securing sanitation, and economic 
subsidies and generous enabling environments may be necessary to secure sanitation for many of the 
least advantaged populations.
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